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Abstract. This paper describes a plaintext related image encryption algorithm
that utilizes the Mojette transform for computation of bins that are subsequently
combined with pixels of the processed image. While the bins are computed solely
from pixel intensities of a plain image and also the combination depends only on
intensities of plain image pixels, the parameters of bins are rearranged according to
used key. This design results in a great sensitivity of the proposed image encryption
algorithm to both plain images and keys, which is verified by a set of experiments.
The paper also tests the resistance of the proposal against statistical and differential
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attacks by means of commonly used measures as correlation coefficients, entropy,
NPCR and UACI. Furthermore, the paper analyses computation speed reached by
the proposed solution. Computed values of all parameters are discussed and then
compared with results obtained by some recent plaintext related image encryption
algorithms.
Keywords: Image encryption, logistic map, Mojette transform, pixel intensity
chaining, plaintext related operation
Mathematics Subject Classification 2010: 94A60, 68U10
1 INTRODUCTION
Security of data transmitted over public networks is an important task these days.
One of the possible solutions for establishing security of data is encryption. Con-
ventional encryption algorithms such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) were
usually designed in a way that is suitable for encryption of rather small blocks of
hexadecimal or binary characters [1, 2]. However, this approach is not suitable for
all data types. Digital images known for their redundancy (vast amount of pixels)
and high correlation between adjacent pixels can be considered as an example.
Encryption of image data by conventional encryption algorithms can lead to
various undesirable results. For example, a basic mode of operation for AES, called
Electronic CodeBook (ECB), only replaces blocks of plain image data by calcu-
lated blocks of encrypted data. In the case that some plain image blocks are the
same, all of them are substituted with identical blocks of encrypted data. This sit-
uation is shown in Figure 1 where AES in ECB mode was used for encryption of
the image with resolution of 256 × 256 pixels and color depth of 8 bits per pixel.
Used encryption key was 0× C4 EB 50 BC 0E C5 EB 50 BC 0E C5 EB 50 BC 0E
C5. This key was acquired from the first 128 bits of binary representation of decimal
part of π.
plain image encrypted image
Figure 1. Contours in encrypted image after encryption by ECB mode of AES
Image Encryption Algorithm with Plaintext Related Chaining 649
As seen in Figure 1, the smooth image areas located in the characters of the
plain image, where the intensities of adjacent pixels do not change, produce several
identical blocks in the encrypted image. On the other hand, the background of im-
age, which contains a grayscale gradient filling, was substituted with many different
blocks. The contrast between these blocks can lead to identification of contours of
the characters from the plain image, and that is undesirable.
The example illustrated in Figure 1 can be viewed as an exaggeration as the used
plain image is an uncompressed bitmap image. However, also images processed by
lossy compression algorithms can contain some identical blocks of pixels. Therefore
this problem can arise also in the encrypted versions of such images.
Furthermore, the encryption of images by conventional encryption algorithms
can lead to bad performance in terms of computational speed. In the case that
used platform does not enable hardware acceleration of encryption [3], the dedi-
cated image encryption algorithms are usually faster [4]. This is due to their better
optimization for the task of image encryption. Considering the mentioned proper-
ties of images and conventional encryption algorithms, images as a data type require
specific and more efficient approach in order to achieve an acceptable performance.
The first dedicated image encryption algorithms were designed in late 1990s.
Probably one of the most popular early image encryption algorithms is the Fridrich’s
algorithm published in 1998 [5], which used chaotic Bakers’ map for achieving the
desired performance. Application of a chaotic map inspired other researchers [6, 7, 8,
9] and nowadays the majority of image encryption algorithms is based on a suitable
chaotic system. Fridrich’s paper was also important because it described a useful
architecture of image encryption algorithms, consisting of confusion and diffusion
stage. This architecture corresponds with ideas of Shannon [10], and with some
modifications it is still used nowadays.
First attempts to break chaotic image encryption algorithms can be traced back
to early 2000s. However, majority of these papers tried to break only one spe-
cific image encryption algorithm [11, 12]. In 2010, Solak et al. proposed a chosen
ciphertext attack based on relations between image pixels during decryption [13].
Solak’s attack is not only able to break Fridrich’s encryption algorithm, but it can
be also used for some other designs with the similar architecture [13]. The perfor-
mance of Solak’s attack was later discussed by Xie et al. in [14], where some minor
improvements were suggested.
Presentation of the Solak’s attack caused changes in the Fridrich’s architecture.
Most authors tried to establish relations between the steps of image encryption algo-
rithm and used plain image (image before encryption). Therefore these approaches
are described as plaintext related image encryption algorithms.
Despite chaotic image encryption algorithms still evolve, the existing algorithms
have already found some applications. They usually require sensitive data to remain
in the form of an image: image steganography [15, 16, 17], transfer and storage of
biometric features [18] or medical images [19].
Image encryption algorithms can be also used for verification of data integrity
of images, because any image processing technique applied on an encrypted image
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leads to the incorrect decryption. If users wish to enhance or modify some image, it
needs to be processed before the encryption. Then the decryption of the encrypted
image leads to the processed image.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes works of other
authors in the field of plaintext related chaotic image encryption. Section 3 explains
techniques used in our proposal and describes the steps of encryption and decryption
algorithms. Section 4 presents obtained experimental results and compares them
with the results achieved by some other similar algorithms. Section 5 discusses the
properties of the proposed solution and concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
Since the introduction of Solak’s attack [13] in 2010, several solutions for suppressing
or even eliminating a possibility of a successful attack have been provided. Fu et al.
proposed their solution in 2012 [20] where parameter of Chebyshev’s map is modified
according to intensity of the previously encrypted pixel. However, these parameter
modifications can lead to fixed points, where behavior of chaotic maps is constant
and therefore unsuitable. Fu et al. used a mechanism that prevents occurrence of
fixed points, however this step decreases the overall computational speed.
A proposal by Kanso et al. from 2012 [21] changed the amount of iterations
of Arnold’s cat map by intensities of currently processed image pixel. As the pixel
intensities are divided by 10 and then rounded to the closest smaller integer number,
multiple intensities lead to identical amount of iterations. Also, each additional map
iteration causes the longer computational time, so timing attacks [22] are possible.
A paper by Fu et al. [23] from 2013 used cyclic shifts of bits from pixel intensities
controlled by intensities of previous image pixels. As there are only 8 possible ways of
cyclic shift of 8 bits, this solution can lead to equivalent shifts for multiple intensities
(there are 256 possible pixel intensities for color depth of 8 bits per pixel).
In 2014, Zhang proposed an encryption algorithm [24] based on a different ar-
chitecture, where one iteration of diffusion is followed by plaintext related confusion
and then second iteration of diffusion. However, this approach can be prone to cho-
sen plaintext attacks [25] in cases when one iteration of diffusion produces a similar
results for two images, and the plaintext related confusion – a rearrangement of
image pixels only shuffles these slightly different image pixels. Similar problems can
happen also with Zhang’s later design from 2015 [26].
Murillo-Escobar et al. proposed an image encryption algorithm in 2015 [27] that
utilized a sum of plain image pixel intensities for calculation of an initial condition
and parameter of logistic map. This solution has two drawbacks: the same sum
can be computed from various images and it is not possible to calculate sum used
during encryption from the encrypted image. For enabling successful decryption,
Murillo-Escobar et al. suggested that this value can be hidden as intensity of one
of encrypted image pixels. This approach was broken by Fan et al. in 2018 [28] by
usage of chosen and known plaintext attacks.
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Three similar plaintext related image encryption algorithms were designed by
Chai et al. in 2017 [29], by Wang et al. [30] and Li et al. [31] in 2018. These
algorithms use hash functions for calculation of the digests of plain images. The
digests are then used for modifying initial conditions or parameters of chaotic maps.
Hash functions should provide significantly different digests for similar plain images,
however, their usage usually negatively affects the computational speed of the whole
algorithm. This drawback is visible mainly in the case of [30], which uses two hash
functions.
We already published one paper describing a plaintext related image encryption
algorithm [32]. However, as the relation was established individually between each
image pixel and each key element by means of Arnold’s cat map, it was necessary to
provide a key with the length of used plain image. This problem was solved by a key
extension algorithm. As the decryption algorithm requires the last elements of the
extended key at start of the decryption, the keys for encryption and decryption are
different. The fact that approach [32] is asymmetric can be viewed as a drawback.
3 PROPOSED SOLUTION
The algorithm proposed in this paper can be used for encryption of images with ar-
bitrary resolution higher than 16×16 pixels and color depths of 8 or 24 bits per pixel.
The restriction placed on image resolution is caused by usage of multiple different
image rows for processing of each row of image pixels in the proposed algorithm. The
plaintext related operation utilizing the Mojette transform (MoT) requires a matrix
of 12× 12 pixel intensities. Together with other 2 rows of pixel intensities used for
plaintext unrelated operations, one row that chooses the computed Mojette bins and
the actually processed row of pixel intensities, the amount of required rows reaches
16. The amount of necessary columns of image pixels, which is 12 was then enlarged
to 16 in order to produce so-called square resolution (16×16 pixels). The mentioned
color depths are common for grayscale and true color images.
The proposed image encryption algorithm uses key with length of 128 bits, stored
in a hexadecimal notation. As it will be shown in Section 4.1, this key length can
be considered as sufficient by means of a brute-force attack. Architecture of the
proposed algorithm is inspired by Fridrich’s approach, however several stages are
added as it is shown in Figure 2.
Steps of the proposed image encryption algorithm were carefully chosen for
obtaining acceptable performance by means of commonly used measures (presented
in Section 4) and also reasonably fast speed of encryption or decryption (investigated
in Section 4.4). The following paragraphs describe individual stages of the proposed
image encryption algorithm.
Combinations with generated pseudo-random sequences (PRSs) are used for two
purposes. The first combination used during encryption helps to achieve better re-
sults for plain images with simple scenes, such as “black” images where intensities
of all pixels are zero. The second purpose is suppression of the possibility of a suc-
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encryp�on
plain image








combina�on with pseudo-random sequence
plaintext related inverse chaining
plaintext unrelated inverse chaining
plaintext unrelated inverse shuffling
combina�on with pseudo-random sequence
decrypted image
Figure 2. An architecture of the proposed image encryption algorithm
cessful attack. If the plain image is combined with two PRSs before and after the
encryption, an attacker would need to guess at least one of the used PRSs before
attacking the encryption algorithm. All PRSs used in our encryption algorithm are
generated by logistic map (LM) and then processed and quantized.
Confusion stage (shuffling of image pixels) consists of two steps. The first step
rearranges image pixels in individual rows of image, while the second step shuffles
pixels in individual columns of the image. The rearrangement of image pixels helps
to suppress the relations between adjacent image pixels, such as their correlation.
Diffusion stage exploits the fact that the intensities of image pixels were already
combined with one PRS. Therefore the diffusion can be achieved simply by per-
forming chaining of pixel intensities. The chaining is done in two steps, the first
one is not related to plain image and it is used only for establishing relations be-
tween intensities of all image pixels. Second step of the chaining is plaintext related
operation based on MoT.
The main contribution of the proposed solution is a description of a novel ap-
proach of plaintext related image encryption based on MoT. MoT was chosen be-
cause it operates directly with matrices of pixel intensities and therefore it enables
relatively simple implementation in the second step of the pixel intensity chaining.
Also, MoT has a relatively large amount of parameters even for matrices with small
sizes. Finally, as these parameters can be rearranged, the usage of MoT brings
a desired nonlinear operation to the proposed image encryption algorithm.
The novel application of relatively simple MoT should lead to a faster perfor-
mance than that obtained by image encryption algorithms based on more com-
plicated techniques. As it is shown in Section 4.5, the proposed image encryption
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algorithm is one of the fastest algorithms when compared to similar plaintext related
image encryption algorithms. Section 4.5 also discusses properties of the proposed
algorithm in contrast with features of other published approaches.
MoT computes bins by using various projections of plain image blocks. Each
bin is calculated as a sum of exactly three pixel intensities chosen from various
color planes of image (if it has multiple color planes). As image pixels are already
rearranged at the point of MoT based chaining, the bin computations use pixel
intensities from various locations of the plain image.
Proposed approach utilizes encryption keys also for shuffling parameters of com-
puted Mojette bins. Therefore, the calculated bins depend on both pixel intensities
and the key. The rearrangement of Mojette parameters also causes a nonlinearity in
calculations, where slight changes in parameters result in big differences in computed
bin values. Calculated bins are then combined with rows of the image according to
rows that are not yet encrypted, therefore this operation is plaintext related.
3.1 Preliminaries
3.1.1 Logistic Map
Logistic map (LM) is an example of one-dimensional chaotic map controlled by one
parameter. LM was popularized mainly by work of May [33]. The equation for
calculation of successive iterates generated by LM can be expressed as Equation (1):
xn+1 = r · xn(1− xn) (1)
where xn+1 ∈ (0, 1) is value of a successive iterate, r ∈ (0, 4) is a parameter of the
map and xn ∈ (0, 1) is value of a current iterate. Calculations of the first iterate x1
utilize value x0 known as an initial condition or initial value.
Chaotic behavior of LM is presented on its bifurcation diagram shown in Fig-
ure 3. While the behavior of the map is predictable after the first bifurcation that
occurs at r ∼ 3, after several more bifurcations the predictability gradually de-
creases. The point where r ∼ 3.56995 is known as “an onset of chaos” [34] and
as a lower bound of parameter r that causes a suitable chaotic behavior of the
LM.
LM often uses so-called transient period for providing more complex chaotic
behavior of generated sequences. The iterates generated during transient period are
used only for modification of initial condition x0. Usual lengths of transient period
are powers of 10, e.g. 1 000 iterates.
3.1.2 Mojette Transform
The Mojette transform (MoT) described in 1995 by Guédon et al. [35] is a discrete
two-dimensional transform that sums matrix elements over projection lines [36, 37].
These sums are called bins and projection lines are given by three parameters –
b which selects summed elements and p and q which determine discrete projection
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Figure 3. A bifurcation diagram of the logistic map
angle. Mathematically, calculation of Mojette bins for an image is given as Equa-
tion (2):





Im(l, k) · δ(b+ kq − pl) (2)
where k = 1, 2, . . . , w is column index of image Im, w is width of the image,
l = 1, 2, . . . , h is its row index, h is height of the image and δ(x) is a Kronecker
delta function, δ(x) = 1 if x = 0, δ(x) = 0 otherwise.
The calculation of Mojette bins for a simple image and a set of two projections
is illustrated in Figure 4. Please note that additions use modulo 256 operation in
order to preserve the interval of inputs (given by 8 bits – a set {0, 1, . . . , 255}) [38].
MoT has various applications including image coding [39, 40]. In our previous
work, we found out that MoT can be used for establishing relations between image
pixel intensities [41]. This feature is also the goal of diffusion stages of the image
encryption algorithms. Furthermore, MoT has a property of redundancy, which
causes multiple usages of pixel intensities during bin computations. While this can
be viewed as a drawback from the point of computational speed, we utilize it to
suppress possibility of differential attacks as each different pixel intensity would
affect several bins.
3.2 Encryption Algorithm
The encryption algorithm takes a plain image P and a key K with length of 16
hexadecimal characters as inputs. Resolution of P needs to be at least 16 × 16
pixels for enabling computations of sufficient number of Mojette bins. The only
output is encrypted image E.
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Figure 4. An example of calculated Mojette bins
3.2.1 Generation and Processing of the Pseudo-Random Sequences
Inputs: plain image P , key K.







Step 1: Height h, width w and number of color planes numcp of plain image P
are determined. These values are used for computation of extended width
wext = w · numcp and total number of pixels numpx = w · h · numcp.
Step 2: Key K is divided to four parts: K1 uses first four bytes of K, K2 utilizes
bytes 5 to 8, K3 is made of bytes 9 to 12 and K4 uses the last four bytes of K.
All four key parts K1 to K4 are then converted from hexadecimal to decimal
notation.
Step 3: Four key parts K1 to K4 are utilized for calculation of four LM (1) param-
eters r1 to r4:
ri = 3.9999 + 25 · 10−6 · (i− 1 + 2−32 ·Ki) (3)
where i = 1, 2, 3, 4 is an index of parameter and key part, coefficient of (i− 1) ·
25 · 10−6 ensures that each ri stays in a different interval and constant of 2−32
fixes the interval of all possible Ki to [0, 1).
Step 4: Six PRSs seq1 to seq6 are generated by six LMs (1). The initial condition
x0 is equal to 0.5 in all cases, values of parameter r are changed during the
transient period according to Table 1. The changing of parameter helps to
establish relations between all generated sequences and all key parts. Lengths
of generated sequences are included in the bottom row of Table 1.
Step 5: The PRSs seq1 to seq6 are quantized by applying Equation (4). Quantized
sequences are denoted as seq ′1 to seq
′
6. Maximal possible value of element after
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Sequence seq1 seq2 seq3 seq4 seq5 seq6
r used iterates 1 to 250 r1 r2 r3 r4 r2 r3
during iterates 251 to 500 r2 r3 r4 r1 r1 r2
transient iterates 501 to 750 r3 r4 r1 r2 r4 r1
period iterates 751 to 1 000 r4 r1 r2 r3 r3 r4
r used for following iterates r1 r2 r3 r4 r2 r3
length of sequence [iterates] numpx wext h 16 16 numpx
Table 1. Parameters of logistic maps and lengths of generated sequences
quantization is individual for each sequence and it is determined by Table 2.
seq ′i =
⌊
(maxi + 1) ·
(
105 · seqi (mod 1)
)⌋
(4)
where i = 1, 2, . . . , 6 is an index of sequence and maxi is the maximal possible
quantized value for each sequence.
Sequence seq1 seq2 seq3 seq4 seq5 seq6
maxi 255 h− 1 wext − 1 15 15 255
Table 2. Maximal possible values of the sequence elements after quantization
The multiplication of LM iterates by a constant of 105 and the modulo operation
help to provide more uniform distribution of values, as it is demonstrated on
the example in Figure 5. This example used two sequences, both with length of
106 iterates, initial condition x0 = 0.5 and parameter r = 4− 10−15. While the
sequence denoted as “before processing” was simply generated by LM (1), the
second sequence was processed by the multiplication and the modulo operation.

















































Figure 5. Effect of multiplication and modulo operation on distribution of iterate values
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Step 6: Sequences seq ′1 and seq
′





h rows and wext columns. The rearrangement uses rows first scanning pattern.
3.2.2 Combination with First Pseudo-Random Sequence
Inputs: plain image P , number of color planes numcp, width w, pseudo-random
sequence seq ′1m.
Output: extended image Pext.
Step 1: Plain image P is rearranged to extended image Pext. Grayscale images
(numcp = 1) are simply copied to Pext, while true color images (numcp = 3)
are decomposed to individual color planes. Columns of red color plane are then
copied into columns of Pext with indexes 1 + 3 · (i − 1), where i = 1, 2, . . . , w.
Columns of green and blue color planes are copied into columns of Pext with
indexes 2 + 3 · (i− 1), and 3 · i where i = 1, 2, . . . , w, respectively.
Step 2: Sequence seq ′1m is combined with extended image Pext by means of bitwise
eXclusive OR (XOR) using Equation (5). This step is necessary for images with
simple scenes (images where most pixel intensities are similar).
Pext = Pext ⊕ seq ′1m (5)
where ⊕ is an operator of bitwise XOR.
3.2.3 Confusion Stage
Inputs: extended image Pext, extended width wext, height h, pseudo-random se-
quences seq ′2 and seq
′
3.
Output: extended image Pext with rearranged image pixels.
Step 1: Pixel intensities in columns of extended image Pext are shuffled by a cyclic
shift to the bottom side of Pext. Size of shift is individual for each column of Pext
and it is determined by corresponding element of sequence seq ′2 (Equation (6)):
Pext(l, k) = Pext (1 + (l − 1 + seq ′2(k) (mod h)) , k) (6)
where l = 1, 2, . . . , h is row index and k = 1, 2, . . . , wext is column index.
Step 2: Pixel intensities in rows of extended image Pext are shuffled by a cyclic shift
to the right side of Pext. Size of shift is individual for each row of Pext and it is
determined by corresponding element of sequence seq ′3 (Equation (7)):
Pext(l, k) = Pext (l, 1 + (k − 1 + seq ′3(l) (mod wext))) . (7)
3.2.4 Diffusion Stage – Plaintext Unrelated Chaining
Inputs: extended image Pext, height h, extended width wext.
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Output: extended image Pext with chained intensities of image pixels.
Step 1: Rows of extended image Pext are scanned from the top to the bottom.
Pixel intensities in individual rows of Pext are chained with pixel intensities in
neighboring rows. The chaining is done by element-wise modulo 256 addition of
intensities from the previous scanned row and then bitwise XOR with intensities
from the next scanned row, as shown in Figure 6. The top row uses the bottom










n actually scanned row




intensi�es for XOR opera�on
Figure 6. Demonstration of chaining for the first two rows
Step 2: Columns of extended image Pext are scanned from the leftmost one to
the rightmost one. Pixel intensities in individual columns of Pext are chained
with pixel intensities in neighboring columns. The chaining is done by element-
wise modulo 256 addition of intensities from previous scanned column and then
bitwise XOR with intensities from next scanned column. The leftmost column
uses the rightmost one as the previous scanned column and the rightmost one
uses the leftmost one as the next scanned column.
Step 3: Rows of extended image Pext are scanned from the bottom to the top. Pixel
intensities in individual rows of Pext are chained by bitwise XOR with intensi-
ties from the next scanned row and then element-wise modulo 256 addition of
intensities from the previous scanned row. The bottom row uses the top row
as the next scanned row and the top row uses the bottom one as the previous
scanned row.
Step 4: Columns of extended image Pext are scanned from the rightmost one to
the leftmost one. Pixel intensities in individual columns of Pext are chained
by bitwise XOR with intensities from next scanned column and element-wise
modulo 256 addition of intensities from previous scanned column. The rightmost
one uses the leftmost one as next scanned column and the leftmost column uses
the rightmost one as previous scanned column.
Four different scans are used for establishing relations between all pixel intensi-
ties. An example of this property is shown in Figure 7 where the fill of matrix
element means difference between two images. The two operations with neigh-
boring rows or columns are utilized for creating relations during both encryption
and decryption.
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Figure 7. Scanning pattern used during plaintext unrelated chaining
3.2.5 Diffusion Stage – Plaintext Related Chaining
Inputs: extended image Pext, extended width wext, height h, pseudo-random se-
quences seq ′4 and seq
′
5.
Output: extended image Pext with intensities of image pixels chained according to
its pixel intensities.
Step 1: A set of parameters of Mojette bins represented by matrix motpar is rear-
ranged similarly as the extended image Pext during confusion stage. The matrix
motpar has 16 rows and 16 columns. Its elements with linear indexes (rows first
scanning pattern) are shown in Table 3. Firstly, a cyclic shift shuffles the pa-
rameters in columns of motpar according to sequence seq
′
4. Then the parameters
in rows of motpar are rearranged depending on sequence seq
′
5.
Indexes (p q) Set of b
1 to 20 (−5 1) {−56,−55,−51,−50,−46,−45,−41,−40, . . . ,−16,−15,−11,−10}
21 to 36 (−5 2) {−57,−55,−52,−50,−47,−45,−42,−40, . . . ,−27,−25,−22,−20}
37 to 48 (−5 3) {−58,−55,−53,−50,−48,−45,−43,−40,−38,−35,−33,−30}
49 to 56 (−5 4) {−59,−55,−54,−50,−49,−45,−44,−40}
57 to 96 (−4 1) {−47,−46− 45,−44,−43,−42,−41,−40,−39,−38, . . . ,−10,−9,−8}
97 to 120 (−4 3) {−53,−50,−49,−47,−46,−45,−44, . . . ,−32,−31,−30,−28,−27,−24}
121 to 128 (−4 5) {−59,−55,−54,−50,−49,−45,−44,−40}
129 to 168 (4 1) {−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, . . . , 34, 35, 36}
169 to 192 (4 3) {−9,−6,−5,−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20}
193 to 200 (4 5) {−15,−11,−10,−6,−5,−1, 0, 4}
201 to 220 (5 1) {−1, 0, 4, 5, 9, 10, 14, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, . . . , 39, 40, 44, 45}
221 to 236 (5 2) {−2, 0, 3, 5, 8, 10, 13, 15, . . . , 28, 30, 33, 35}
237 to 248 (5 3) {−3, 0, 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 20, 22, 25}
249 to 256 (5 4) {−4, 0, 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 15}
Table 3. A set of parameters utilized for computing Mojette bins
Rearrangement of parameters according to sequences generated by a key es-
tablishes the relations between values of computed bins and the key. As the
parameters are shuffled, even small change in their indexes should result in
a significant difference of computed bin values – this step causes nonlinearity.
The set of parameters was chosen according to several rules – the greatest com-
mon denominator of p and q is equal to one and q is always positive. These
two conditions were formulated by Guédon et al. [38] and ensure uniqueness of
projection angles. Furthermore, as our approach uses MoT for specific purposes,
we introduced other conditions:
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• |p| > 3 ensures that the summed intensities belong to different pixels,
• |p| (mod 3) 6= 0 provides pixel intensities from various color planes,
• values of b were chosen in a way that bins are always made as sums of exactly
three intensities.
Step 2: Rows of extended image Pext are scanned from top to bottom. Intensities
of an actually scanned row are stored in a vector rowact. Intensities of a row
that is two rows under the rowact are stored in a vector rowmodif . Then, the
following 144 intensities (columns first scanning pattern) are copied to vector
vecint. These operations are depicted in Figure 8. If row indexes for rowmodif














Figure 8. Operations with rows of extended image
Please note that pixel intensities rows of Pext were already shuffled during con-
fusion stage. Therefore the 144 intensities in vecint were chosen from the whole
image. Also, the requirement of 144 pixel intensities causes a restriction of mini-
mal image resolution – the size of 16×16 pixels was chosen as the closest square
resolution to 16× 12 pixels.
The sixteen rows are necessary as one is actually scanned row (rowact), another
is used for modifications (rowmodif ), two rows are utilized during plaintext un-
related chaining and the remaining 12 rows produce a block of 12 × 12 pixels
required for computation of Mojette bins.
Step 3: Vector vecint is rearranged to matrix matint with 12 × 12 elements (rows
first scanning pattern). This matrix is used for computation of 256 bins by
MoT with parameters from rearranged matrix motpar. Bin values are stored
in a vector vecbins. The redundancy property of MoT causes that 256 bins are
calculated from various triples of 144 pixel intensities (they are used multiple
times).
Step 4: Intensities of rowact are element-wise combined with bins vecbins by means
of bitwise XOR (Equation (8)). A bin value for each intensity from rowact is
chosen according to corresponding intensity from rowmodif . The resulting vector
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of intensities is stored in the matching row of extended image Pext.
Pext(1:h, k) = Pext(1:h, k)⊕ vecbins (rowmodif (k)) (8)
where 1:h denotes sequence 1, 2, . . . , h, k = 1, 2, . . . , wext is column index and ⊕
is an operator of bitwise XOR.
3.2.6 Combination with Second Pseudo-Random Sequence
Inputs: extended image Pext, number of color planes numcp, width w, pseudo-
random sequence seq ′6m.
Output: encrypted image E.
Step 1: Sequence seq ′6m is combined with extended image Pext by means of bitwise
XOR using Equation (9). This step suppresses possibility of attacks on the
plaintext related diffusion stage.
Pext = Pext ⊕ seq ′6m. (9)
Step 2: Extended image Pext is rearranged to encrypted image E. Grayscale images
(numcp = 1) are simply copied to E, while true color images (numcp = 3) are
combined from their individual color planes. Columns of red color plane of E are
achieved from columns of Pext with indexes 1 + 3 · (i− 1), where i = 1, 2, . . . , w.
Columns of green and blue color planes of E are obtained from columns of Pext
with indexes 2 + 3 · (i− 1), and 3 · i where i = 1, 2, . . . , w, respectively.
3.3 Decryption Algorithm
Steps of decryption algorithm are analogous to encryption. The opposite order of
operations can be seen in Figure 2. One exception of the opposite order is decom-
position to two-dimensional extended image Eext and rearrangement to a matrix
with one or three color planes. Generation and processing of the PRSs is the same
as during encryption. Combinations with PRSs are swapped, the first one is done
with sequence seq ′6m, while the second one uses seq
′
1m. Plaintext unrelated inverse
chaining utilizes subtraction instead of addition, the usage of all bitwise XOR oper-
ations stays the same. Also, the order of subtraction and bitwise XOR operations is
reversed. The shifts of image pixels during inverse confusion utilize negative values




All experiments described in this section were performed on a PC running MATLAB
R2015a on Windows 10 OS, with a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i7-6500U Skylake CPU and
12 GB of RAM. A set of experimental plain images is shown in Figure 9. Their
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parameters are mentioned in Table 4. Please note that images black and blackG
are magnified in all following figures, as their low resolution enables detection of




Figure 9. A set of experimental plain images
Image lena lenaG peppers peppersG black blackG
height [px] 512 512 512 512 16 16
width [px] 512 512 512 512 32 32
color depth [bits/px] 24 8 24 8 24 8
Table 4. Parameters of used plain images
A set of three experimental keys in hexadecimal notation is displayed in Table 5.
Value of K1 was obtained from the first 128 bits of binary representation of decimal
part of π. The difference between K1 and K2 is highlighted by italics.
Key Value
K1 0× C4 EB 50 BC 0E C5 EB 50 BC 0E C5 EB 50 BC 0E C5
K2 0× C4 EB 51 BC 0E C5 EB 50 BC 0E C5 EB 50 BC 0E C5
K3 0× 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Table 5. A set of experimental keys
Encrypted versions of some plain images from Figure 9 are shown in Figure 10.
All encryptions used key K1.




Figure 10. Some examples of encrypted images
4.1 Size of Key Space
The proposed algorithm uses key with length of 16 bytes. Therefore the size of key
space can be expressed as 25616 = 28·16 = 2128. Considering that one decryption
of color image with resolution of 512 × 512 pixels takes approx. 420 ms (refer to
Section 4.4 for details), the brute-force attack would require approx. 2.7192× 1032
years to complete. Therefore we consider this type of attack as infeasible.
4.2 Key and Plaintext Sensitivity Analysis
4.2.1 Key Sensitivity
Key sensitivity of the proposed algorithm is illustrated in Figure 11. The top row
of images was created by encryption of plain image lena by three various keys.
Left image in the bottom row shows differences between images encrypted by two
different keys. The other two images in the bottom row illustrate decryption by the
correct key (middle image) and by incorrect key (right image).
4.2.2 Plaintext Sensitivity
Sensitivity of encryption algorithm to slight changes of plaintext (in the form of plain
image before encryption or encrypted image before decryption) can be demonstrated
by two simple experiments.
The first experiment increases intensity of the last scanned pixel (in the bottom
right corner of blue color plane) of image black. The pixel intensity is increased by
one level from 0 to 1. The left and middle images in Figure 12 illustrate effect of
one different pixel intensity before encryption with the same key.
The second experiment starts with encryption of image black by key K1. The
result is shown in left image in Figure 12. Then, the encrypted image is modified by
increasing the intensity of last scanned image pixel (in the top left corner of red color
plane) of encrypted image. The modified image is finally decrypted by key K1. The
decryption without modification should lead to the original plain image black, as
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difference image lena encrypted by lena encrypted by
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Figure 12. Effects of modifications of image before and after encryption
shown in Figure 9. However, as seen in the right image in Figure 12, the decryption
of modified image produced a totally different image.
4.3 Robustness Against Certain Types of Attacks
This section investigates the robustness of the proposed image encryption algorithm
against commonly used attacks in a field of image encryption. The ways how mea-
sures used for assessment of the robustness are computed can be interpreted as
examples of certain types of well known attacks.
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In the case that the proposed image encryption algorithm improves values of
these measures, it can be stated that the algorithm resists not only the mentioned
basic attacks, but also some of the more complicated attacks based on these general
attacks. A detailed analysis of robustness against all published attacks would be
extensive, so this paper investigates only robustness against certain general attacks.
4.3.1 Statistical Attacks
Robustness of image encryption algorithms against statistical attacks can be exam-
ined by several measures. First of all, usage of encryption should reduce significant
peaks present in the histogram of a plain image. This situation is illustrated in
Figure 13 by histograms of plain image lenaG and its version encrypted by key K1.













pixel intensity in plain image
50















Figure 13. Comparison of image histograms
Secondly, the encryption algorithms should suppress the correlation of adjacent
image pixels. This feature can be shown by correlation diagrams, which use inten-
sities of two pixels as coordinates of one plotted point. If pixel intensities are highly
correlated, the diagram should have points near line y = x. Encryption should
result in nearly uniform distribution of points in these diagrams. An example of
correlation diagrams for plain image lenaG and its version encrypted by key K1 is
shown in Figure 14. Both diagrams contain 1 000 points, which were plotted ac-
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cording to intensities of 1 000 randomly chosen pairs of horizontally adjacent image
pixels.
intensity of plain pixel [l, k]

























intensity of encrypted pixel [l, k]



























Figure 14. An example of correlation diagrams
Various image encryption algorithms can be compared by numerical parameters.
These measures include correlation coefficients ρ, which are calculated separately for
horizontally (ρh), vertically (ρv) and diagonally (ρd) adjacent pairs of image pixels
and entropy H. Both correlation coefficients and entropy are computed individually
for each color plane of the analyzed image.
Correlation coefficients ρ can be calculated by Equation (10):
ρ =
∑numpp







where pp = 1, 2, . . . , numpp is an index of pixel pair, numpp is total amount of pixel
pairs, vectors vec1 and vec2 contain intensities of the first and the second pixels from
pixel pairs, respectively, and vec denotes arithmetic mean of vector vec.




p(in) · log2 (p(in)) [bits/px] (11)
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where L is color depth of color plane, in denotes intensity of image pixel and p(in)
stands for probability of occurrence of pixel with intensity in. The theoretical upper
bound of entropy H is given by color depth of the color planes.
Computed values of correlation coefficients ρ and entropy H are presented in
columns 4 to 7 of Table 6. Symbol “–” denotes either the only color plane for
grayscale images (in the second column) or usage of plain images (in the third
column).
4.3.2 Differential Attacks
Differential attacks are used for revealing properties of image encryption algorithms
by comparing two encrypted images E1 and E2. These two images were created by
encryption of plain images P1 and P2, where P2 is slightly modified version of P1.
The modification should be minimal, i. e. intensity of one image pixel from one
color plane is changed by one level.
Robustness of image encryption algorithms against differential attacks is tested
by two measures: Number of Pixel Change Ratio (NPCR) and Unified Average
Changing Intensity (UACI) [42]. While the first one only counts the amount of
different pixels, the second one also takes into account the size of differences.








Diffmat(l, k) [%] (12)
where h is height of images E1 and E2, w is their width, l and k are line and column
indexes and Diffmat is a difference matrix, Diffmat(l, k) = 1 if E1(l, k) 6= E2(l, k),
Diffmat(l, k) = 0 otherwise.








|E1(l, k)− E2(l, k)|
2L − 1
[%] (13)
where L is color depth of color plane.
Calculated values of NPCR and UACI are included in columns 8 and 9 of Table 6.
Each value is an arithmetic mean of 100 repeated measurements with randomly
chosen modified pixel intensity in the plain image. Symbol “–” denotes either the
only color plane for grayscale images (in second column) or usage of plain images
(in third column). NPCR and UACI of plain images could not be computed as
the modification of one plain image pixel intensity is not spread to other intensities
(images are not encrypted).
The paper by Wu et al., which analyzed NPCR and UACI [42] also mentions
so-called expected values of these parameters for certain resolutions of encrypted
images. If the computed values of NPCR and UACI are greater than the expected
values, it can be concluded that encryption algorithm successfully suppressed the
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similarity of plain images P1 and P2. Wu et al. also defined significance levels α,
which can be used for predicting amount of successful differential attacks on a pair
of encrypted images.
The computed expected values of NPCR and UACI for a color plane with reso-




ρh ρv ρd H NPCR UACI




0.9749 0.9782 0.9593 7.5889
not computedG 0.9632 0.9729 0.9497 7.106
B 0.9376 0.9515 0.9212 6.8147
R
K1
0.0004 0.0013 0.0005 7.9993 99.6101 33.4738
G −0.001 −0.0021 −0.0037 7.9994 99.6109 33.4742
B −0.0032 −0.002 0.0017 7.9992 99.6103 33.4746
R
K2
0.0033 0.0026 −0.001 7.9994 99.6105 33.4742
G 0.0006 0.0015 −0.0016 7.9993 99.6113 33.4749
B 0.0016 0.0013 0.003 7.9993 99.6101 33.4743
R
K3
0.0028 −0.0012 0.0002 7.9993 99.6101 33.4736
G −0.0007 0.002 0.0002 7.9993 99.6109 33.4731
B −0.0042 −0.0017 0.0005 7.9993 99.6098 33.4744
lenaG –
– 0.9679 0.9761 0.955 7.2344 not computed
K1 0.0008 0.0005 −0.0004 7.9992 99.61 33.4714
K2 0.0015 0.001 −0.0012 7.9993 99.6099 33.4725




0.9635 0.9663 0.9564 7.3388
not computedG 0.9811 0.9818 0.9687 7.4963
B 0.9665 0.9664 0.9475 7.0583
R
K1
0.0007 −0.005 0.0009 7.9994 99.6112 33.4719
G −0.0009 0.0006 −0.0018 7.9993 99.6106 33.4727
B 0.0013 −0.0011 0.0026 7.9993 99.611 33.4712
R
K2
−0.0007 0.0004 −0.0026 7.9994 99.6114 33.4707
G −0.0028 −0.0015 0.0031 7.9993 99.6103 33.4718
B −0.0005 −0.0019 0.0011 7.9993 99.6108 33.4723
R
K3
0.0034 −0.0005 0.0006 7.9992 99.61 33.471
G −0.0025 −0.0014 −0.0007 7.9994 99.6102 33.4708
B −0.0035 0.0003 0.0006 7.9992 99.6109 33.4714
peppersG –
– 0.9768 0.9792 0.9639 7.5944 not computed
K1 0.0051 0.0007 −0.0001 7.9991 99.6106 33.4721
K2 0.0019 −0.0011 −0.0008 7.9991 99.6121 33.4729
K3 −0.0002 −0.0006 −0.0016 7.9993 99.6117 33.4735
Table 6. Achieved numerical parameters
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Results presented in Table 6 show that encryption by the proposed algorithm
helps to decrease values of correlation coefficients ρ. Also, the values of ρ are quite
similar for different keys. The biggest difference of ρ caused by usage of other key
is present for image peppersG where key K1 produces ρh = 0.0051, while other keys
produce values of 0.0019 and −0.0002, respectively. However, the high value of ρh is
balanced by values of ρv and ρd, which are better for K1. Values of ρ for other two
images (black and blackG) are affected by their low resolution and the simplicity of
their scene (all image pixels have zero intensity). Encryption of image blackG by
key K1 resulted in ρh = −0.0191, ρv = −0.0616 and ρd = −0.0181.
The encryption also increases entropy H of the images. Obtained values are
close to theoretical bound of 8 bits per pixel and they are more uniform among
various color planes. Usage of different keys does not significantly affect the values
of H. Image blackG encrypted by key K1 produced H = 7.5929 bits per pixel.
Values of NPCR and UACI are similar for various combinations of color planes
and keys applied on individual images. Images black and blackG have greater vari-
ance of these values as their low resolution makes even slight differences in amount
of changes (NPCR) or their intensity (UACI) more noticeable. Examples of NPCR
and UACI for image blackG encrypted by key K1 are 99.6719 % and 33.4304 %,
respectively.
All arithmetic means of NPCR and UACI for images lena, lenaG, peppers
and peppersG are higher than the expected values. However, some of the 100
measurements have lower values than the expected value, which causes limited
confidence about possibility of a successful differential attack. Figure 15 illus-
trates 100 repeated measurements of NPCR for image lenaG encrypted by key K1.
The displayed significance level α = 0.001 results in a confidence level of 99.9 %
(NPCR > 99.5717 %). Therefore 1 out of 1 000 predictions of a possible differential
attack can be wrong [42].
measurement




















Figure 15. The illustration of 100 measured NPCR values
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The properties of the proposed image encryption algorithm regarding commonly
used attacks in the field of image encryption can be evaluated from several aspects.
Firstly, the key space of the proposed algorithm is big enough for preventing brute-
force attacks. Secondly, the design of the proposed algorithm ensures certain level
of sensitivity to both used keys and plain or encrypted images. Also, the architec-
ture of the proposed algorithm contains a plaintext related stage, which eliminates
application of Solak’s attack [13]. Finally, the robustness against statistical and dif-
ferential attacks can be evaluated by values of correlation coefficients ρ, entropy H,
NPCR and UACI.
Therefore it can be concluded that the proposed image encryption algorithm is
robust against all currently known attacks in the field of image encryption.
4.4 Analysis of Computational Speed
Encryption and decryption times are other important properties of the image en-
cryption algorithms. The speed of performed operations can be also evaluated via
encryption speed venc or decryption speed vdec, which take into account the resolu-
tion and color depth of images (Equation (14)):
voper =
h · w · d
220 · toper
[MB/s] (14)
where h, w and d are height, width and color depth of image, 220 is a constant
representing amount of bytes in a megabyte and toper is time in seconds needed for
an operation (either encryption or decryption).
Considering different specifications of various computers used for experiments,
the speed of image encryption algorithms can be given by the number of processor
cycles required for operations with one byte of data. These values are denoted as
cycenc for encryption of one image byte and cycdec for decryption of one image byte.
The number of cycles necessary for an operation (either encryption or decryption)





where fcpu is processor clock frequency measured in Hz and voper is speed of the
investigated operation given in B/s. Please note that the computed values of cycles
required for operations with one byte expect that only one core of the processor is
utilized (at 100 %) for the purposes of the image encryption algorithms.
Times, speeds and numbers of processor cycles for operations with images and
keys from the experimental set are presented in Table 7. The times are arithmetic
means of 100 repeated measurements. Speeds and numbers of the processor cycles
were computed from these means.
Results shown in Table 7 lead to several conclusions. Firstly, the speed of
operations does not depend on the key used. Secondly, both the encryption or
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Image Key
tenc tdec venc vdec cycenc cycdec
[ms] [ms] [MB/s] [MB/s] [cycles/B] [cycles/B]
lena
K1 436.2245 420.5649 1.7193 1.7833 1454.08 1401.9
K2 436.3845 420.3934 1.7187 1.784 1454.59 1401.35
K3 436.7181 421.081 1.7174 1.7811 1455.69 1403.63
lenaG
K1 126.2499 122.7206 1.9802 2.0371 1262.5 1227.23
K2 126.9473 122.6332 1.9693 2.0386 1269.49 1226.33
K3 126.905 122.6084 1.97 2.039 1269.04 1226.09
peppers
K1 436.3264 419.8888 1.7189 1.7862 1454.42 1399.62
K2 436.4397 421.8564 1.7185 1.7779 1454.76 1406.15
K3 435.8724 419.6389 1.7207 1.7873 1452.9 1398.76
peppersG
K1 127.1529 122.8078 1.9661 2.0357 1271.55 1228.08
K2 126.8485 122.7695 1.9709 2.0363 1268.46 1227.72
K3 127.3672 122.8902 1.9628 2.0343 1273.69 1228.92
black
K1 2.557 2.6487 0.5729 0.553 4363.76 4520.8
K2 2.5451 2.6251 0.5756 0.558 4343.29 4480.29
K3 2.535 2.6628 0.5779 0.5501 4326.01 4544.63
blackG
K1 1.5223 1.5587 0.3207 0.3133 7795.45 7979.57
K2 1.5124 1.564 0.3229 0.3122 7742.34 8007.69
K3 1.4991 1.5803 0.3257 0.309 7675.78 8090.61
Table 7. Measured times, speeds and the numbers of the processor cycles
decryption speeds and the number of the processor cycles required for processing
of one byte of data for images with the same resolution and color depth are very
similar. Also, the speeds for images with a higher resolution (such as lena and
peppers) are lower than the speeds for images with a lower resolution. This can
be caused by generating of longer PRSs since LM (1) is a recursive function where
each currently generated iterate (xn+1) requires the previous iterate (xn) for its
computations. The lower speeds result in an increased number of the processor
cycles required for processing of one byte of data.
The values for images black and blackG are distorted by rather low resolution
of the images (32 × 16 pixels). For images with resolution of 512 × 512 pixels,
the encryption speeds venc are approx. 1.7 MB/s for true color images and approx.
1.95 MB/s for grayscale images. The decryption speeds vdec are slightly higher.
4.5 Comparison with Other Approaches
The comparison of numeric parameters obtained by image encryption algorithms
is not an easy task, as researchers tend to use different plain images and various
measures. This section summarizes results reported in papers [20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 29,
30, 31, 32], which all describe plaintext related image encryption algorithms. The
comparison of parameters presented in Table 8 is divided into two parts – the first
part includes values obtained by papers that used true color image lena, while the
second part shows values from papers that utilized grayscale image lenaG.
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Results for this paper were obtained by using key K1. Some papers used plain
images with different resolution: refs. [20, 30] used resolution of 256 × 256 pixels,
while refs. [24, 26] used resolution of 357× 317 pixels. Algorithm published in [27]
was already broken in [28]. An approach presented in [32] is asymmetric (meaning
that the encryption and decryption keys are different).
The numbers of the processor cycles required for encryption of one byte cycenc
were calculated with respect to both resolutions of used images and specifications
of the computers used. All compared approaches obtained the encryption times
used for calculation of cycenc in various versions of the MATLAB computational
environment. None of the compared algorithms mentioned the usage of multiple
processor cores.
If some paper presented multiple values for one parameter, the best results were
chosen for the comparison. The most outstanding value was highlighted by italics
for each parameter.
Approach
ρh ρv ρd H NPCR UACI cycenc
[–] [–] [–] [bits/px] [%] [%] [cycles/B]
red color plane of true color image lena (512× 512 pixels)
proposed 0.0004 0.0013 0.0005 7.9993 99.6101 33.4738 1454.08
ref. [21] −0.0029 −0.015 0.0129 7.9997 99.62 33.51 ∼2270
ref. [27] 0.0135 not reported 7.9974 99.63 33.31 648.53
grayscale image lenaG (512× 512 pixels)
proposed 0.0008 0.0005 −0 .0004 7.9992 99.61 33.4714 1262.5
ref. [20] 0.0088 −0.0087 −0.006 7.9902 99.62 33.46 9063.44
ref. [24] −0.0046 −0.0511 −0.0168 7.9993 99.6101 33.4679 8230.32
ref. [26] −0.0084 0.0041 −0.0463 7.9984 99.6077 33.4441 3366.6
ref. [29] 0.0044 0.0151 0.0012 7.9993 99.62 33.45 15120.97
ref. [30] −0.0037 −0.0029 0.0047 7.9975 99.5956 33.5512 43151.97
ref. [31] 0.0013 0.0008 0.0066 7.9993 99.6107 33.4436 5185.19
ref. [32] 0.0042 0.0022 −0.0045 7.9992 99.1802 33.3483 795.17
Table 8. Comparison of numerical parameters
As seen in Table 8, the proposed solution provides the best values of correlation
coefficients ρ among presented values. The results for entropy H are similar, and in
most cases close to the theoretical bound of 8 bits per pixel. The highest entropy
value for red color plane of color image lena is achieved by approach [21], while
highest entropy values for grayscale image lenaG are obtained by algorithms [24,
29, 31].
Majority of NPCR and UACI results are higher than the expected values. The
best value of NPCR for color images was obtained by design [27], however this
algorithm was already broken [28]. NPCR values for grayscale images are similar,
except for proposal [32]. The best values were produced by approaches [20, 29].
The best UACI values were achieved by algorithm [21] for true color images and by
approach [30] for grayscale images.
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Reported numbers of the processor cycles required for encryption of one byte
cycenc are greatly influenced by the architecture of the algorithms. This fact is most
visible in the approaches [29, 30], which used hash functions and the algorithm [27],
which inserted plaintext related parameter into the encrypted image. While hash
functions significantly slow down the whole algorithms, the other solution needs
a relatively small number of processor cycles for the encryption. However, as it was
already pointed out, this solution was already broken [28]. Another approach with
different properties was described in [32], where an asymmetric image encryption
algorithm was proposed. Except these solutions, the design proposed in this paper
is the fastest.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper described an image encryption algorithm, which employed the Mojette
transform for plaintext related chaining of pixel intensities. The values of Mojette
bins, which are going to be combined with image pixels are chosen by pixel intensities
that are yet not encrypted, therefore this proposal is plaintext related. Moreover,
the Mojette bins are computed also from pixel intensities of plain images.
Parameters of Mojette bins were chosen in a way that each bin is affected by pixel
intensities from various color planes. Also, the pixel intensities that are summed
by the Mojette transform are chosen from different columns of the processed im-
ages.
As the combinations of images and computed Mojette bins are done with whole
rows of pixel intensities, the proposed solution is among the fastest plaintext re-
lated image encryption designs. Also, the experimental results show that the al-
gorithm proposed in this paper reaches excellent values of correlation coefficients.
The obtained values of entropy, NPCR and UACI are comparable with other pro-
posals.
Probably the biggest drawback of the proposed algorithm is the fact that not
all of 100 performed NPCR and UACI measurements are higher than the expected
values. This disadvantage could be improved in the future.
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